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INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE
TRIAL JUDGE'S VANTAGE POINT
JUDGE JoHN KANE*
When I was appointed to the bench twenty-eight years ago, the vast area of
international law was primarily a matter of intellectual curiosity for federal district
judges. We looked at comparative legal systems with an eye toward making our
own work a little less burdensome and confusing. The trial judge is essentially a
pragmatist controlled by the discipline of rules and dominated by the ideologies of
others in the form of binding authority. Until recently, we were not called upon to
examine the judgments and decisions of other nations.
International law today, however, is rapidly emerging in ways that affect a
court's daily tasks. This emergence is coincident to globalization and a judge's
intellectual curiosity has shifted to pragmatic necessity. The importance of
globalization is obvious: twenty-five percent of the U.S. gross domestic product is
internationally derived.'For example, there is no longer such a thing as an
American car; its parts, design and various manufactures come from throughout
the world.2Another example: guess, for a moment, the number of countries in
which the clothes you are now wearing have their origins and assemblies.
We operate today under a growing number of international conventions,
treaties and protocols. Moreover, globalization comprehends increased awareness
of and access to cultures and places far different from our own. The reach of
multi-national corporations, the speed of world-wide communications and the
growth of English as a universal language have given international law an
importance in the federal trial courts that could not even be imagined a quarter of a
century ago.
Until 1992, the district court of Colorado had cumbersome procedures for
admitting lawyers from other parts of the United States to appear as counsel.
*Judge John Kane is a United States Senior District Judge in the District of Colorado and a graduate of
the University of Denver College of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge Professor Ved Nanda for
inviting him to present this paper at the Sutton Colloquium and thus provoking these thoughts about an
important topic.
1. Flerida Ruth P.Romero, Lecture: Legal Challenges of Globalization, Delivered as Part of the
Indiana Supreme Court Lecture Series at Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis, 15 IND.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 501, 503 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration Is Not Your Father's Oldsmobile,
2005 J. DIsp. RESOL. 323, 324 (2005).
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Admission was couched in the antiquated phrase pro hac vice and required the
persistent presence of a Colorado lawyer as local counsel.3 Today, the price of
admission is $160 plus a statement listing the various courts to which the applicant
has been admitted. 4At least half of the lawyers appearing before me come from
other parts of the United States. More to the point, I have given the temporary
right of audience to lawyers from England, India, Hong Kong and Canada. With
increasing regularity I receive written submissions from lawyers in Europe, Asia,
Australia and South America. Depositions in cases tried in my court take place
with local authorization in Japan, South Africa, Indonesia and elsewhere. It would
require an entirely separate speech to address the international aspects of patent
and other intellectual property cases that form a major part of my docket today.
(For the first ten years I was on the bench, I never had a patent case assigned to
me.)
The fact is that international law and foreign law are being raised in our
federal courts more often and in more areas than our courts have the knowledge
and experience to handle. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed, "There is a
great need for expanded knowledge in [this] field, and the need is now. '5
With the foregoing in mind, I will describe the approach that I take in
developing this needed knowledge and skill as a trial judge. I will not be able to
resist also opining on some of the problems we face as judges because of the
xenophobia and obduration of some appellate judges and politicians. Undoubtedly
I will talk about what most of you already know, but my viewpoint as a trial judge
may assist you in understanding the need to educate judges in the area of
international law, as Justice O'Connor suggested.
International law in U.S. courts is considered a branch of our law in much the
same way that torts, contracts or securities law are part of our system. We use it
when the facts of the case demand it. The question of whether an individual
invoking international law has rights or obligations on the international plane is
essentially irrelevant. What is relevant is whether this or that international law, as
a matter of American law, is appropriate to the resolution of the controversy before
the court. The source of the rights and obligations at bar may be international law,
but the determinations will be made in the same way and to the same extent that
the source would be domestic legal rights and obligations.
3. See D.C. COLO. L. Civ. R. 301 (repealed 1992).
4. See D.C. COLO. L. Civ. R. 83.3 and D.C. COLO. L. CT. R. 57.5; see also Application for
Admission to the Bar of the Court in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
(2005), http://www.co.uscourts.gov/forms/bar-app-new.pdf (requiring applicants to list all jurisdictions
in which they are admitted to practice and submit a check to the Clerk of the Court in the amount of
$160.00).
5. Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice, United States Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the
American Society of International Law Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting 351 (Mar. 16,
2002), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/inthecourts/ASILKeynote.Add-2002 Just_O'Connor.pdf.
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In a very real sense, it is not the international legal system that operates in
U.S. courts but rather principles of international law that a judge determines are
appropriate in the particular case. This role of international law in U.S. courts was
addressed by the Supreme Court in 1900 in the landmark case of The Paquete
Habana.6 While one can never feel secure in the stability of precedent as cases are
decided, and this particular case seems to be awaiting the judicial hangman, The
Paquete Habana remains controlling authority. In the opinion, the Court noted
that President William McKinley had ordered a naval blockade of the Cuban coast
during the Spanish-American War "in pursuance of the laws of the United States,
and the law of nations applicable in such cases."7  The blockade commander
captured two fishing vessels that were sold as prize of war.8The original owners
sued to recover the proceeds of the sales. 9The Supreme Court, sitting in admiralty
as the prize court, held that international law prohibited seizing coastal fishing
vessels during time of war. 10
The Court wrote:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.... I I
The meaning of this broad language has been the subject of academic
controversy, but for a trial judge the message is clear. I am instructed that a treaty,
executive act, legislation or authoritative judicial decision trumps customary
international law. If there is no trump, then the customary international law card is
played. The commentators, however, are more subtle. One view is that the first
sentence, which quoted that "International law is part of our law" etc., means that
international law is automatically and directly applicable in U.S. courts whenever
relevant issues are up for decision. According to this analysis, customary
international law is one of the laws of the United States comprising "the supreme
law of the land" under Article VI of the Constitution that must be faithfully
executed by the President under Article IL, Sec. 3.12 Under this view, courts have
no independent role in their interpretation or application. Other commentators
emphasize the second sentence regarding the trump cards and point out that
President McKinley limited the application of customary international law in his
executive order. Acts in violation of the executive order were therefore ultra vires
and perforce void. Under this view, international customary law is treated as any
other law under the common law method. Thus, the conclusions of U.S. courts are
6. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
7. Id. at 712.
8. Id. at 679.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 708.
11. Id. at 700.
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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influenced by prior international decisions or practice of the community of nations,
but not compelled by them.
Perhaps more to the point of this address, the Restatement (Third) on the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States rejects the view that newly developed
customary international law could supersede a prior federal statute.1 3 Unless,
however, it is clear that Congress intended a different result, U.S. courts will
attempt to interpret federal statutes to conform to customary international law,
obligations and conventions. The courts will give special consideration and
deference to views of the executive branch when called upon to interpret
customary international law, and those rules or principles whose existence is
disputed by the executive branch will normally not be given effect.
I also think it safe to say that in this area of developing jurisprudence for the
federal courts, as in most other instances, considerable weight is given to the
Restatement. When confronted with a question of international law, a federal trial
judge is most likely to ask counsel, "What does the Restatement say?"
Having described the basic outline of the trial judge's approach, I want to turn
to what is for me, and I hope for you, a more interesting aspect: the revolution in
the subject of international law in the U.S. courts. It is the recognition of
individuals as capable of both exercising international rights and being compelled
to respect international obligations. What was once the exclusive province of
nation-states, national interests and sovereignty has been transformed into a
dynamic and volatile subject of modem litigation. Individuals are no longer
passive objects of international legal actions.
In this new development, a very old and unused law has been revived: I speak
of the Alien Tort Statute that was passed by Congress in 1789 and hardly used at
all until recently. This statute incorporates into U.S. law the law of nations for a
specific purpose. The Alien Tort Statute gives federal courts original jurisdiction
over civil actions "by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."' 14 This statute was intended to assist the
newly formed United States government in taking its place among the civilized
nations of the world, primarily to obtain something more than mere sufferance
from the nations of Europe.
The statute was designed to avoid international conflict by providing an
objective forum in which aliens could seek redress for injuries inflicted by
American citizens, either in the United States or abroad, when those injuries were
such as to implicate the honor or protective duty of the injured alien's country.
The statute is solely a grant of jurisdiction and does not require a particular result
in any case.
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115
(1987).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007).
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In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a 1980 decision of the Second Circuit, the court
found jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute over a claim by an alien against an
official of his own government for the torture-slaying of the plaintiff's son. 15 The
court found that torture conducted under color of law was a violation of the law of
nations and that the international law of human rights did not distinguish between
violations directed at one's own subjects and violations directed at others. 16 Faced
with a possible flood of cases brought by aliens against their own governments
asserting violations of international human rights law, the federal courts have
moved to limit Filartiga's principles both on political question and lack of
available remedy grounds. 
17
However, jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute does not lie against a
foreign state. Jurisdiction in such cases is found only if the cause of action falls
within one of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. In general terms the exception to sovereign immunity does not
apply to discretionary acts; the Supreme Court has held that the exception is
limited by its terms to damages occurring in the United States. 18U.S. embassies are
not within this exception. 19
As one commentator has stated about the Alien Tort Statute:
[O]ver the last quarter-century, starting with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
the venerable statute has been deployed as the basis for a thriving
body of human rights jurisprudence, permitting U.S. judges to give
effect within their courtrooms to some of the most fundamental
commitments made by nations to one another in the years following
World War 11.20
This brings us to a discussion of some U.S. Supreme Court cases that, among
other things, have prompted legislation which at first blush is amusingly stupid, but
on reflection is dangerous both to the concept of international law and to the place
of the United States in the community of nations.
The first case is the 1992 decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain that
has been condemned even by nations friendly to the United States and described
by Justice Stevens as "monstrous.",2' The Court held that the conduct of an agency
of the United States, the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], in kidnapping a
foreign national while in his own country and transporting him to the United States
against his will despite the existence of a fully functioning extradition treaty, did
not affect the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court over his person.22 The Court
15. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1117-20 (9th Cir. 2006).
18. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004) (listing the exceptions of violation of safe
conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy).
19. See id.
20. Steven M. Schneebaum, The Paquete Habana Sails On: International Law in U.S. Courts
After Sosa, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 81, 82 (2005).
21. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 687 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
22. See id. at 668-70.
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held in effect that treaties do not confer rights on individuals unless they are
expressly so described in the advice and consent to their ratification.23 Alvarez
was tried for his alleged role in the brutal murder of DEA Agent Enrique
Camarena. 24 The judge directed a verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the
prosecution's case. It was a good result for the plaintiff, but a sorry one for the
law of nations.
Dr. Alvarez-Machain then sued DEA Agent Sosa and the other individual
kidnappers. 26 The burden on Dr. Alvarez-Machain as plaintiff was not to prove
that the Alien Tort Statute created a private cause of action, but that the facts
alleged in the complaint described a violation of international law. For reasons
that do not bear scrutiny, the Court found that Dr. Alvarez-Machain failed to
establish that there was a firm international consensus on an enforceable right to be
free from temporary restraint by law enforcement officers acting
extraterritorially.27
It is not, however, the result that has spurred opposition, but rather the Court's
announced premise that international human rights are the legally enforceable
rights of individuals and that the conduct of individuals may be found to be
actionable violations of those rights. The Bush Administration had called upon the
Court to reject those propositions that carry with them the tradition dating back to
Chief Justice Marshall that international law is part of our law, with its
interpretation consigned to the judicial branch.28
In this sense, there is a Marbury v. Madison flavor to Justice Souter's opinion.
Marbury did not get his appointment as a justice of the peace, but the doctrine of
judicial review of the political branches' actions in determining the law was firmly
established. In Sosa, Dr. Alvarez-Machain did not recover for the wrongs done to
him, but the principle of international law being part of U.S. law was emphatically
stated.
The third case is the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons,
holding that executing an offender for crimes committed before he was eighteen
years old would be cruel and unusual punishment.29 Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion cites international instruments and other nations' practices to demonstrate
evolving standards and attitudes against capital punishment of youthful
offenders.3 °  Justice Scalia's dissent attacks the majority's reliance upon
international treaties and foreign practices.31 Justice O'Connor filed a separate
23. Id. at 667-69.
24. Id. at 655; U.S Drug Enforcement Administration, Biography of Agent Enrique Camarena,
http://www.dea.gov/agency/IObios.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
25. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655-56.
26. Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 107 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1996).
27. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
28. David R. Mapel, Fairness, Political Obligation, and Benefits Across Borders, 37 POLITY 426,
437 n.25 (2005).
29. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
30. Id. at 575-76.
31. Id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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dissent finding insufficient evidence of a national consensus on the issue, but
endorsing the relevance of international practice to Eighth Amendment analysis.
32
Justice O'Connor's comments merit emphasis. She said:
Obviously, American law is distinctive in many respects.... [b]ut this
Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values
prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we should not be
surprised to find congruence between domestic and international
values, especially where the international community has reached
clear agreement - expressed in international law or in the domestic
laws of individual countries- that a particular form of punishment is
inconsistent with fundamental human rights.
33
Interestingly enough, in the 2004 decision Olympic Airways v. Husain, Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented from the majority opinion for its
failure to address how the courts of U.S. treaty partners addressed the issue of what
constitutes a factual event under the Warsaw Convention.34 Justice Scalia's
dissents must be studied carefully to discern when and under what circumstances
he thinks international law is relevant to American judicial enquiry. That,
however, is not my assigned topic. Suffice for the moment to say that Justice
Scalia asserts that foreign law should have no bearing on the proper interpretation
of the U.S. Constitution and judges interpreting our Constitution should pay no
heed whatsoever to how other countries interpret their own constitutions.35
Two other decisions merit reference in this regard. The 2002 case of Atkins v.
Virginia held that the cruel and unusual punishments prohibition of the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution of mentally retarded defendants. 36 The Court
determined that "the evolving standards of decency" that mark the progress of a
maturing society placed the execution of the mentally retarded beyond the pale.
37
In so ruling, the Court took account of practice in American states, but also
referred favorably to a brief filed by the European Union that catalogued the
overwhelming repudiation of the practice by the rest of the world.38
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas and invalidated a state
law criminalizing homosexual sodomy. 39 The Court's opinion focused on U.S.
sources, but Justice Kennedy's majority opinion also cited a 1967 Act of the
English Parliament and a 1981 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights
invalidating similar criminal prohibitions.4 ° Justice Kennedy alluded to these
32. See id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 605.
34. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 316 n.21; see also Brief for The European Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 4-10, McCarver v. N.C., 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727).
39. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
40. Id. at 572-73; see also id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Canadian case law with
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foreign laws to rebut the claim of the supporters of the Texas law that criminal
prohibition of homosexual sodomy was universally accepted within Western
civilization.
All of these cases, and particularly the last two, prompted a U.S. congressman
and a U.S. senator to introduce a bill called the "Constitution Restoration Act" that,
among other things, would make it an impeachable offense for a federal judge to
base a decision on foreign law. Section 201 of the Act states:
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a
court of the United States may not rely upon any constitution, law,
administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial
decision, or any other action of any foreign state or international
organization or agency, other than the constitutional law and English
common law.4'
Aside from its grammatical incompetencies, the proposed Act does not define
what it means by "constitutional law" and "English common law." A plain reading
suggests that a judge could be impeached for relying on the Ten Commandments.
Pretty clearly, John Locke, Montesquieu, Edmund Burke, and Rousseau would be
suspect, and I could be impeached for citing Plato's Republic. Aside from all else,
it would make determining the intent of the Framers a more onerous task.
As for the English common law, one would need to tread softly. Most
American states include within their constitutions or statutes a provision that the
common law of England that can be considered of full force stops as of March 24,
1607: the day the first ship sailed from England to what would become the lost
colony of Jamestown, Virginia. I would dare not cite the Statute of Frauds which
was enacted by the British Parliament in 1677. A host of other precedents, such as
the McNaghten Case, would be swept away from the American lexicon. I think
the point is made that this proposed statute is utterly stupid. In the unlikely event
that Congress would enact the Constitution Restoration Act, it would not be
enforceable and the first court to review it would likely strike it down without
having to rely on any foreign law.
I said earlier, however, that further reflection suggests to me that beyond the
xenophobic blindness of this proposed legislation, a more insidious danger lurks.
We cannot afford to ignore outrageous demonstrations of ignorance such as the
canard that the Holocaust never happened, nor the instant one which presumes that
the fundamental law of the United States can be understood without reference to
the history of western civilization.
On a more practical basis, the attack on the use of international law receives
aid and comfort from significantly influential elements of the business community.
It is not directly related to the Guantanamo cases, nor for that matter to the brutal
murder of DEA agent Camarena described in the Sosa decision. The gravamen is
disapproval as an example of "judicial imposition of homosexual marriage").
41. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 201 (2004); Constitution
Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005).
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that human rights activists have begun to use the Alien Tort Statute in suits against
businesses, including UNOCAL and others, for allegedly participating in systemic
human rights abuses in cooperative ventures with Third World governments.42
The threat of subjecting overseas activities of American businesses to judicial
review is ominous. As the United States government increases its use of American
businesses and their subsidiaries to enforce and enlarge the new American
imperium, the idea of being sued in American courts for reprehensible acts is not
an unrealistic proposition. Why, one must speculate, would the U.S. Department
of Justice argue for the most restricted judicial interpretation of the Alien Tort
Statute? One has only to suggest the different consequences of class actions and
individual tort claims to come up with a plausible explanation.
From a trial judge's perspective, the class action looms large. Indeed, only a
few mega-verdicts would be enough to change much of the overseas conduct of
American businesses.
It is obvious that our world is becoming increasingly interdependent. The age
of nationalism is not over, but it will change or perish. There is much to learn
from every system of law and government and if we fail to take advantage of these
experiences and wisdom, we do so at our peril. It is neither desirable nor possible
that this country we love so much can go it alone or sustain the status of a
superpower without embracing the concept and the reality of mutual global
concern. What a wonderful reality it would be for this country to be loved for
what we do and revered for the justice we provide.
42. See, e.g., Nat'l Coal. Gov't of the Union of Burma v. UNOCAL, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334
(C.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Doe I v.
UNOCAL Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
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